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Abstract: Conservation organizations have increasingly raised concerns about escalating rates of illegal
hunting and trade in wildlife. Previous studies have concluded that people hunt illegally because they are
financially poor or lack alternative livelihood strategies. However, there has been little attempt to develop
a richer understanding of the motivations behind contemporary illegal wildlife hunting. As a first step, we
reviewed the academic and policy literatures on poaching and illegal wildlife use and considered themeanings
of poverty and the relative importance of structure and individual agency. We placed motivations for illegal
wildlife hunting within the context of the complex history of how wildlife laws were initially designed and
enforced to indicate how hunting practices by specific communities were criminalized. We also considered
the nature of poverty and the reasons for economic deprivation in particular communities to indicate how
particular understandings of poverty as material deprivation ultimately shape approaches to illegal wildlife
hunting. We found there is a need for a much better understanding of what poverty is and what motivates
people to hunt illegally.
Keywords: ivory, poaching, rhino horn, rural development, wildlife trade
Hacia un Nuevo Entendimiento de la Conexio´n entre la Pobreza y la Caza Ilegal de Animales
Resumen: Las organizaciones de conservacio´n han incrementado cada vez ma´s la preocupacio´n con re-
specto a la caza ilegal y el mercado de fauna. Los estudios previos han concluido que la gente caza ilegalmente
porque son financieramente pobres o carecen de estrategias alternativas de sustento. Sin embargo, ha habido
pocos intentos por desarrollar un entendimiento ma´s robusto de las motivaciones detra´s de la caza ilegal
contempora´nea. Como primer paso, revisamos la bibliograf´ıa acade´mica y pol´ıtica sobre la caza furtiva y el
uso ilegal de la fauna y consideramos los significados de la pobreza y la importancia relativa de la voluntad
individual y de estructura. Colocamos las motivaciones para la caza ilegal dentro del contexto de la historia
compleja de co´mo las leyes de vida silvestre estuvieron inicialmente disen˜adas e impuestas para indicar
co´mo las pra´cticas de caza de comunidades espec´ıficas estuvieron criminalizadas. Tambie´n consideramos la
naturaleza de la pobreza y las razones de la privacio´n econo´mica en comunidades particulares para indicar
co´mo los entendimientos particulares de la pobreza como material de privacio´n eventualmente forman a las
estrategias contra la caza ilegal. Encontramos que existe una necesidad de entender de mejor manera que´ es
la pobreza y que´ motiva a las personas a cazar ilegalmente.
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Introduction
Recent increases in illegal wildlife hunting and trad-
ing have attracted international attention, particularly of
high-value endangered species vulnerable to illegal inter-
national trade. A recent report by the United Nations
Environment Programme notes that illegal hunting of
different species demand diverse strategies, including de-
mand reduction campaigns, use of anti-money laundering
regulations, development of surveillance networks, and
increased use of force (Nellemann et al. 2014). Illegal
hunting covers a very wide range of activities associated
with complex motivations and drivers that require differ-
ent responses. It can be driven by demand for high-value
luxury products (e.g., sturgeon [Huso huso] hunting to
meet international demand for caviar or Chiru hunting
[Pantholops hodgsonii] in China to produce shatoosh
wool). In contrast, certain species of bears are in de-
mand for the production of cheap pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, and antelopes and primates are hunted for meat for
subsistence and sale. Through an examination of policy
and academic literatures on poaching and illegal wildlife
use our goal was to develop a richer understanding of
contemporary illegal hunting by connecting theories ex-
plaining individual motivations with those focusing on
broad social, economic, and political drivers.
Current understanding of illegal hunting is hampered
by a lack of data. Moreover, it is frequently approached
primarily as a conservation concern rather than an issue
of poverty and development. Yet, the argument that it
results from poverty is widely used (Adams et al. 2004a;
Nellemann et al. 2014). We argue that effective conser-
vation strategies need to move on from this character-
ization and recognize the complexities of motivations
and political-economic contexts so that illegal wildlife
hunting can be addressed in a more effective, socially
and environmentally just manner.
We placed illegal wildlife hunting in the context of a
wider conceptual debate in the social sciences, that of
structure and agency. This allowed us to discuss their
relative importance in motivations to engage in illegal
hunting and to argue that a broader view of illegal hunt-
ing and poverty is needed that places greater emphasis
on historical and contemporary political-economic and
social contexts.
Defining Illegal Wildlife Hunting
We use the term illegal wildlife hunting rather than
poaching in order to be explicit about the type of be-
havior we are referring to: any hunting or wildlife ex-
traction not explicitly sanctioned by the state or private
owners of wildlife. Here context matters, for example,
a particular act (shooting a wild animal) might be illegal
within a protected area but legal when the animal crosses
the park boundaries or threatens people or property.
This context includes the colonial history of hunting reg-
ulations; laws cannot be uncritically accepted as given
(MacKenzie 1988; Jacoby 2003; Neumann 2004). For ex-
ample, colonial legislation removed hunting rights from
Africans to protect the sports hunting and safari industries
for European colonizers (MacKenzie 1988; Jacoby 2003;
Neumann 2004). These laws criminalized some African
livelihood practices and were often refined and extended
by states after independence. The origins of illegality in
hunting partly explain why some communities in Sub-
Saharan Africa continue to resist legislation to protect
wildlife. In essence those communities maintain that they
have a right to access and use wildlife (Mackenzie 1988;
Carruthers 1995; Garland 2008; Roe 2008b; Robbins et al.
2009; Fischer et al. 2013).
The very nature of illegal wildlife hunting hampers
understanding of it. Published research on the motives of
illegal hunters is scant largely because few are willing to
identify themselves (St. John et al. 2010). The available
work tends to distinguish between subsistence and
commercial hunting. The former typically targets small
game (e.g., antelope), to meet food needs, hunted
with simple technology (e.g., traps and snares) and
tends to have a minimal impact on wildlife populations
(Mackenzie 1988; Bodmer & Lozano 2001; Adams 2004b;
Adams 2009; Lowassa et al. 2012; Fischer et al. 2013;
Twinamatsiko et al. 2014; Harrison et al. 2015). By
contrast, commercial hunters typically operate within or-
ganized groups that target commercially valuable species,
such as rhinoceroses, elephants, orangutans (Pongo
abelii, P. pygmaeus), and tigers, and use more advanced
technologies, including firearms and geographic posi-
tioning systems (Ellis 1994; Ellis & Reeve 1995; Leakey
2001; Duffy 2014; Nellemann et al. 2014; Harrison et al.
2015). However, the distinction between subsistence
and commercial hunting can be blurred because meat
may be hunted to supplement both diets and income
(Mackenzie et al. 2011; Vega et al. 2013). Furthermore,
illegal wildlife hunting for subsistence purposes can
become commercial. For example, subsistence hunting
can transform into commercial hunting in response
to the arrival of logging companies in remote forests,
where a workforce has to be fed or transport links give
easier access to urban markets (Nellemann et al. 2014;
Harrison et al. 2015). In a similar vein, hunting in conflict
zones (discussed below) cannot be easily categorized as
subsistence or commercial because it blends elements of
both (Redford 1992; Duffy 2010; Nellemann et al. 2014).
Poverty and Illegal Wildlife Hunting
Poverty is often perceived as the root cause of illegal
wildlife hunting because poor people hunt illegally to
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satisfy basicmaterial needs (Mackenzie et al. 2011; Twina-
matsiko et al. 2014; IUCN et al. 2015). For example, a
study of Bwindi National Park in Uganda showed that
those arrested for unauthorized activities in the national
park were significantly poorer and more likely to live
closer to the national park and farther from trading cen-
ters than others (Twinamatsiko et al. 2014). A recent
study on the links between poverty and wildlife crime
in Uganda indicated that one of the most effective ways
to reduce illegal wildlife hunting is poverty alleviation
(Harrison et al. 2015). Similarly, more effective involve-
ment of the rural poor in both development and con-
servation projects is also advocated (Roe 2008a; Roe
(ed) 2013; Sanderson & Redford 2003; Roe 2015; Roe
et al. 2015). However, poverty is a complex condition,
which makes these claims opaque. What form of poverty
and poverty alleviation are referred to? Challender and
MacMillan (2014) note, poverty is not a singular category,
and they draw attention to the importance of relative
poverty in driving illegal wildlife hunting. However, we
go a step further to argue that a much more sophisticated
analysis of what constitutes poverty, relative poverty, and
inequality are needed to develop a better understanding
of what the ultimate drivers of illegal wildlife hunting
are. We could not review debates on poverty in much
detail (but see Hulme 2010), but it is important to ex-
plain the relevance of engaging with the meaning of
poverty.
Within debates about conservation there has been
a tendency to rely on largely economic definitions of
poverty that focus on material deprivation. For example,
in a systematic review of evidence of the links between
poverty and biodiversity, 70% of published papers that
addressed poverty as part of conservation used income
as the key measure (Roe et al. 2014). It follows logically
that illegal wildlife hunting can supposedly be tackled
via provision of paid employment (e.g., as rangers and
tour guides), which increases levels of material wealth, or
alternative income generation or disbursement schemes,
such as development of markets for local agricultural pro-
duce or funds from selling safari hunts and photographic
tourism (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Adams & Infield 2002;
Roe et al. 2010; Spenceley & Meyer 2012). Based on this
logic, MacKenzie et al. (2011) suggest that because ille-
gal resource use in Kibale National Park, Uganda, is not
driven by food insecurity, then the approach of enforcing
exclusion of local communities is justified.
The argument that people hunt illegally because they
are materially poor is repeated in powerful policy are-
nas. For example, the International Conservation Cau-
cus Foundation (ICCF), which involves one-third of the
membership of the U.S. Congress, has stated that ex-
treme poverty in Africa is the source of illegal wildlife
hunting as well as radicalization (ICCF 2014). The same
view was expressed in the high-level meeting on illegal
wildlife trade hosted by the U.K. Government in May
2013 (Government of the United Kingdom 2013). We
do not dispute the argument that material deprivation
matters, but there are 3 problems with defining poverty
only inmaterial terms. First, the understanding of poverty
is itself impoverished; it does not capture what being
poor means. Following Sen’s (1999) formulation, poverty
also encompasses a lack of power, prestige, voice, and
an inability to define one’s future and day-to-day activi-
ties, which are difficult to measure in quantifiable terms.
Second, it denies that the poor have agency and are able
to lead fulfilling and meaningful lives. Accordingly, illegal
wildlife huntingmay not simply be away of avertingwant
and deprivation, it may be a means of seeking and affirm-
ing identity, status, lifeways, custom, and local prestige.
A current challenge for conservation is how to measure
human well-being (Milner-Gulland et al. 2014) and mul-
tidimensional poverty in order to capture factors such
as voice, prestige, and status (Sen 1999). It is critical to
develop an understanding of how such factors relate to
behaviors, such as illegal wildlife hunting, so that they
can be integrated into conservation measures.
MacDonald’s (2005) work on the Himalayan ibex tro-
phy hunting scheme in northern Pakistan underlines the
importance of this perspective (2005). Aiming to con-
serve a declining ibex population, the IUCNworked to es-
tablish a trophy-hunting scheme that required local peo-
ple to refrain from hunting, an activity they had engaged
in for centuries and sold hunting permits to international
hunters. The proceeds from the sale of permits were
split between local people and the national government.
However, the scheme failed to halt local ibex hunting,
largely because hunting was a source of prestige and sta-
tus. Distributing money from trophy hunts created new
sources of prestige. It did not remove all the incentives to
hunt because those controlling the money were different
from those who previously controlled the meat (also see
Marks 2001).
Third, defining poverty purely in economic terms al-
lows it to be presented as a technical issue that can be
solved through the provision of alternative sources of
income. This in turn lends itself to technical interventions
that are limited to economic incentives (e.g., alternative
livelihood schemes) and disincentives (e.g., enforcement
to make wildlife hunting illegal). But a broader approach
to understanding poverty (such as Sen’s analysis), would
see interventions aimed at reducing illegal wildlife hunt-
ing embedded or mainstreamed into wider development
initiatives that address the factors that drive the develop-
ment of illegal wildlife hunting in the first place (IUCN
et al. 2015).
Structure, Agency, and Illegal Wildlife Hunting
We suggest recasting the debate with a foundational ap-
proach in social sciences—that of structure and agency.
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Those who debate structure and agency discuss the ex-
tent to which decisions made by individual agents are
constrained by the structural context in which they exist
(Hay 2002). A more thorough and robust engagement
with this key debate would allow for a fuller understand-
ing of why people hunt illegally.
Structural Approaches to Illegal Wildlife Hunting
Structural explanations emphasize the importance of the
wider context, which recognizes the complex role of
international demand. Although material poverty may
encourage people to hunt illegally, such poverty can
only become a driver if there is demand from wealth-
ier communities (IFAW 2008; Duffy 2010; Ayling 2013;
Challender & Macmillan 2014). For example, a report by
TRAFFIC-ASIA examined the drivers of the illegal wildlife
trade and concluded that the increase in illegal trading
of wildlife was directly related to the rise in incomes in
Southeast Asia. This report added an oft-missed aspect,
namely the complexity of the networks involved and the
wide range of cultural, political, economic, and social
contexts in which these function. It linked local-level ru-
ral harvesters, professional hunters, traders, wholesalers
and retailers with the final consumers of wildlife in loca-
tions distant from the source of the product. The illegal
wildlife trade provided varying forms of economic sup-
port to different parts of the network: a source of regular
income, a safety net, or as profitable business (TRAFFIC
2008).
The importance of structural contexts are also
discernible in the ways that illegal wildlife hunting
has been used as a financial underpinning for conflicts
across Sub-Saharan Africa for some time, including
Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s Angola and Mozambique
in the 1980s, and the Great Lakes region since 1996
(Ellis 1994; Humphreys & Smith 2011, 2014). The rise
in illegal hunting in Central African Republic (CAR)
and its relationships to regional security issues (Chad,
Cameroon, CAR, and Gabon) was detailed in a report by
UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon (UN 2013). Zakouma
National Park in Chad has also suffered hunting by rebel
groups to fund cross-border wars. Garamba National
Park in Democratic Republic of Congo was used as a
base by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 2012, and
the LRA financed operations through the illegal hunting
and sale of elephant ivory (UN 2013; UNEP et al. 2013;
White 2014). However, these characterizations have
been questioned. Lombard suggests that linking illegal
ivory hunting to LRA and Janjaweed relies on simplistic
labels that are strategically used by governments in the
region to entice external help or to demonize illegal
hunters as outsiders from neighboring states (Lombard
2012; White 2014). Furthermore, conflicts can produce
large-scale population displacements and refugee camps;
refugees and internally displaced people can turn to
illegal wildlife hunting to feed themselves or to earn cash
income. A study by TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa found
that rations provided in refugee camps in Tanzania were
not sufficient, so refugees turned to hunting to meet
protein needs (Jambiya et al. 2007).
Hunting that is linked to the illegal international
wildlife trade is also portrayed as part of wider concerns
about national and global security risks. For example,
the chief executive officer and chairman of Conserva-
tion International, recently called poverty, extinction and
radicalism a “perfect storm” that threatens global sta-
bility (Conservation International 2013). Similarly, the
Wildlife Conservation Society has launched its 96 Ele-
phants campaign, which has 3 central pillars Humans
and Elephants, Terror and Ivory, and Heroes and Hope
that link poverty, regional instability, illegal wildlife hunt-
ing, and terrorism (Wildlife Conservation Society 2014).
Furthermore, some conservation nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) and national governments have tried
recently to claim that illegal wildlife hunting for ivory
in the Horn of Africa is being used to fund Al Shabaab
(a militia group based in Somalia but allied to Al Qaeda
since 2012). These claims were reported in a 2012 re-
port by Elephant Action League (EAL) (Kalron & Crosta
2012) andwere taken up in the international media and in
policy discussions (Lawson & Vines 2014; White 2014).
Elsewhere, we questioned the evidence base of these
claims (the EAL report was based on very limited empiri-
cal research in Somalia) and contend that the blunt links
made between illegal hunting for ivory and terrorism are
overly simplistic (Duffy et al. 2015). A recent report from
UN United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and
INTERPOL note that claims Al Shabaab was trafficking
30.6 t of ivory per annum (representing 3600 elephants
per year) through southern Somalia are “highly unreli-
able” and that the main sources of income remain char-
coal trading and ex-pat finance (Nellemann et al. 2014).
Furthermore, in making the link to global security, the
underlying reasons for the appearance and activities of
militia and rebel groups are left as a black box and are not
discussed. It means that complex social, economic, and
political issues are largely framed as a question around
the impact of illegal wildlife hunting on wildlife rather
than approaching them in more expansive and politically
sensitive ways that help us understand why people hunt
illegally in the first place. Brashares et al. (2014) partially
meet this need when they argue that policies to tackle
illegal wildlife hunting and trafficking need to look at un-
derlying causes, primarily by strengthening local tenure
over resources. This is important, but focusing solely on
tenure overlooks important factors. One needs to ex-
amine how social, economic, and political inequalities
are produced in the first place, how they might en-
courage individuals or communities to engage in illegal
wildlife hunting, and then tackle those, which is a much
larger task.
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The significance of approaches that emphasize the
importance of structural context, indicate how context
constrains individual choice. Once this is understood,
one may be able to design better policy responses. These
could include tackling the historical removal of hunting
rights, dispossession from land to create protected areas,
creation of better education and employment opportuni-
ties in urban areas, and more rural-development efforts.
Put simply, we contend that structural approaches are
needed to shape and define possible policy responses to
tackle illegal wildlife hunting and that these will look very
different from current approaches.
Agential Approaches to Illegal Wildlife Hunting
The second set of explanations for illegal wildlife hunt-
ing draws on approaches that emphasize agency. Such
explanations acknowledge the influence of the wider
social context but place emphasis on the agency of in-
dividuals. Ultimately agential approaches are anchored
in the idea that people have the capacity to act indepen-
dently (Ostrom 2010; St. John et al. 2013) and revolve
around understanding how individuals respond to the
circumstances they face; these approaches are anchored
in disciplines such as economics and social psychology.
Economic analyses of human behavior are traditionally
underpinned by a model of rational choice. In such
analyses, rational actors aim to maximize their utility or
“level of satisfaction” (Janssen et al. 2010; Ostrom 2010).
Models of rational choice have made an important contri-
bution to understanding how people involved in illegal
wildlife hunting may respond to enforcement activities
such as ranger patrols. For example, Milner-Gulland
and Leader-Williams (1992) showed that the probability
of detection significantly influences decisions to hunt
rhinoceros and elephants illegally in the Luangwa Valley,
Zambia. Their models also suggest that local people
engage in illegal hunting and organized gangs react
differently to law enforcement. Integrated conservation
and development projects (ICDPs) may induce the
former to refrain from hunting illegally, the latter could
only be deterred through increased enforcement.
Models of rational decisionmakers have also been used
to explore decisions made by households that under-
take multiple livelihood activities (Milner-Gulland 2011).
These household utility models are comparable to those
used in agricultural and development economics and
have been used to explore how individual households
allocate labor to different livelihood activities (Milner-
Gulland 2012; also see Keane et al. 2008). A modeling
study by Damania et al. (2005) shows how ICDPs could
have unintended consequences. Their model provided
a premium price for crops in order to raise the oppor-
tunity cost of hunting, a common suggestion for reduc-
ing legal and illegal wildlife hunting. Counterintuitively,
their results indicate that although the proportion of la-
bor devoted to agriculture increases, the extra income is
invested in increased bushmeat consumption and new
hunting gear, which would perversely enable hunter-
farmers to target more vulnerable and commercially valu-
able species. The overall impact on reducing hunting
(legal and illegal) was ambiguous (Damania et al. 2005;
Milner-Gulland 2012).
The decisions individuals make are also influenced by
their preference for present over future benefits. With
respect to poor people living in rural areas of the global
South, these dynamics are poorly understood. For exam-
ple, it is assumed that the poor are preoccupied with
difficult livelihoods in the present and as a result have
high discount rates that result in overexploitation of local
resources to fulfill immediate needs. However, evidence
from food security analysts indicates that the poor often
eat less to preserve productive capital and chances of
producing food in the future. This calls into question the
commonly held view of poverty-induced environmental
degradation (Moseley 2001).
While still assuming that individuals make rational deci-
sions about how to act based on an evaluation of informa-
tion available to them, social psychologists use different
types of predictors from economists. Social psychologists
highlight interactions of internal (e.g., attitudes and val-
ues) and external (e.g., other people and availability of
resources) influences on behavior by measuring these
cognitive components (Manfredo et al. 2009; also see
Litchfield 2013). One influential approach is the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen 1991). This theory states that a
person’s behavior can be predicted by 3 factors: attitude,
subjective norms (perceived social pressure), and per-
ceived degree of control over performing a behavior (e.g.,
availability of required knowledge, skills, and resources).
The relative importance these factors have on people’s
behavior differs from one behavior to another. For exam-
ple, Williams et al. (2012) show that training could en-
courage people to cultivate xate´ (Chamaedorea ernesti-
augusti) in Belize rather over harvest wild plants. The
training focused on increasing technical knowledge and
developing a perception that individuals could succeed
in cultivating it; attitudes and norms barely influenced
this behavior. In contrast, attitudes and norms were both
important predictors of landowners’ intentions to con-
serve forest in the agricultural frontier of South American
Gran Chaco (Mastrangelo et al. 2013; also see a study
on illegal killing of jaguars [Panthera onca] by ranchers
[Marchini &Macdonald 2012]). Identifying which factors
most strongly relate to people’s intention to engage in
behaviors of conservation concern (e.g., illegal wildlife
hunting) can provide valuable insights when one seeks
to influence behavior.
The concept of individual agency is particularly perti-
nent to the discussion of illegal wildlife hunting. Based
on logical agential approaches, positive incentives (e.g.,
receipt of benefits) encourage compliance, whereas
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negative incentives (e.g., risk of punishment) deter rule
breaking. This notion is exemplified in discussions on
the illegal hunting of elephant and rhinoceros because
many arguments, both for and against legalized trade, are
based on the premise that individuals are incentivized
by the promise of rewards (Biggs 2013a, 2013b; Duffy
2013).
Policy Implications
Debates about the structural and agential explanations
for illegal wildlife hunting matter; they are not simply
theoretical debates. They shape and inform conservation
strategies to address the problem on the ground, for bet-
ter or worse.
Many conservationists are aware of the complex
interlinkages between wider contexts and individual
motivations. Confronted with complex and pressing
challenges surrounding illegal wildlife hunting, those
responsible for protected areamanagement, for example,
may implement approaches that tackle agential factors
as a short-term or immediate response (e.g., through
capacity building projects and community engagement
projects, see Baker et al. 2012) while working toward
addressing structural or contextual factors in the longer
term. However, their ability to produce the scale of
structural change needed to develop socially just forms
of conservation is limited. Specific conservation projects
(on their own) cannot overturn the social, economic,
and political factors that produce illegal wildlife hunting
in the first place; such fundamental change requires
much broader global scale shifts.
It is precisely because of the need to work at scale that
we should be aware of what sorts of explanation, and di-
agnoses of the problem, are employed. Explanations that
emphasize the importance of structural context question
the effectiveness of conservation interventions that are
built solely on the premise that either positive or negavie
incentives targeting individual behavior will lead to effec-
tive, sustainable solutions for biodiversity conservation.
Management of natural resources is widely dependent on
negative incentives and on rules prohibiting certain activ-
ities.Wider questions of social justice (that go beyond the
immediate concerns of economic deprivation) are not ad-
equately addressed. However, enforcement is financially
costly, and provision of adequate security prohibitively
expensive for many states (Jachmann & Billiouw 1997).
Critics of approaches to illegalwildlife hunting that rely
on the use of force and local community exclusion from
protected areas argue that it is important to address the
broader factors that produces illegal wildlife hunting in
the first place (Brockington et al. 2008; Bu¨scher 2013).
Reliance on deterrence creates poor relations between
conservation authorities and local people by restricting
access to resources that may have an important (or irre-
placeable) role (Infield 2001). Stern (2008) argues that
trust and legitimacy between protected-area staff and
local people are key factors for voluntary compliance,
where general agreement with formal regulations does
not necessarily exist.
Higher rates of illegal hunting in Africa are increasingly
used to justify the use of force, including greater use of
arms, shoot-to-kill policies, expansion of ranger numbers,
contracting of security services to the private sector, and
use of new technologies (drones, camera traps, thermal
imaging) (Duffy 2014; White 2014; Sandbrook 2015).
For instance, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon claims
that a more militarized approach to conservation law en-
forcement is needed (UN 2013). As we argue elsewhere,
greater levels of enforcement by states, NGOs, or private-
sector operators may produce quick fixes in the short
term, but they are problematic (Duffy et al. 2015). In the
Liwonde National park in Malawi, South African private
military company personnel were used to train the park
rangers. Later, park employees were implicated in over
300 deaths, 325 disappearances, 250 rapes, and numer-
ous instances of torture from 1998 to 2000 in this park
alone (Neumann 2004). Such forceful approaches can
be counter-productive and can alienate local communi-
ties (Peluso 1993; Neumann 2004; Dressler et al. 2010;
Lunstrum 2013).
Agential explanations for illegal wildlife hunting are
also discernible in the strategies that rely on systems of
positive incentives designed to encourage people to com-
ply with wildlife regulations. Positive incentives assume
that if money or benefits in kind are given to communi-
ties or individuals they will be encouraged to behave in
a certain way (e.g., refrain from illegal resource extrac-
tion). Since the 1980s, efforts to integrate local people
into conservation efforts have gained wide support (e.g.,
ICDPs and community based natural resource manage-
ment). Strategies for achieving participation have usually
focused on economic links between people in communi-
ties and protected areas. Most typically, this relates to the
potential income to be made from alternative livelihood
strategies, including safari tourism, trophy hunting, and
sale of products (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Roe et al. 2015).
The focus on economic incentives assumes that market
forces will protect the environment. The arguments de-
ployed in favor of incentives as ameans of reducing illegal
wildlife hunting are apparent in claims that tourism can
reduce poverty, provide economic incentives to individ-
uals and communities, and encourage people to change
behaviors towards wildlife (UNEP et al. 2013). However,
despite a range of initiatives and considerable donor in-
vestment it has proved difficult to provide tangible bene-
fits from conservation to local communities, especially in
Sub-Saharan Africa. This can be because most protected
areas do not create sufficient revenue to off-set the costs
to communities of maintaining them (Emerton 1998;
Newmark &Hough 2000; Dressler et al. 2010) or because
the distribution of benefits is uneven (Bandyopadhyay &
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Tembo 2010; Richardson et al. 2012). In addition, other
studies indicate that provision of alternative livelihoods
simply means they become additional rather than alter-
native sources of income; therefore, although household
well-being may increase, illegal wildlife hunting may con-
tinue (Ferraro & Kramer 1997; Ostrom 2010).
Explanations that emphasize the importance of struc-
tural context call into question the effectiveness of such
incentive schemes because they do not tackle the histor-
ical, economic, social, and political factors that produce
illegal wildlife hunting in the first place. These factors
could include problems arising from eviction and dis-
placement from protected areas. Addressing these factors
means conservationists should design approaches that
enhance wider forms of rural development to give local
communities a genuine range of choices (or freedoms in
Sen’s [1999] terms) to shape their own lives or at a mini-
mum that engage local communities as managers of and
participants in wildlife conservation schemes (Roe et al.
2015). More broadly, policies to tackle illegal wildlife
huntingwould need to be embeddedwithin and linked to
policies that promote just social, political, and economic
relations. The danger of policies promoting greater en-
forcement alone is that even if they could succeed in
creating small islands of relative peace inside protected
areas, they would not do anything and may in fact exac-
erbate the issues found beyond them, which ultimately
cause illegal wildlife hunting in the first place.
Conclusion
Our exploration of the literature on the links between
poverty and illegal wildlife hunting reveals that under-
standing is limited and conservationists need to take a
more expansive view of what constitutes illegal wildlife
hunting,whatmotivates people to hunt illegally, and how
to tackle the problem. Rather than simply seeing hunting
as a matter of legality or illegality, we suggest hunting
needs to be understood in its historical, social, and
political context (MacKenzie 1988). This means acknowl-
edging that some communities could regard laws that
criminalize their continued use of wildlife as unjust
precisely because these laws were instituted by colonial
regimes or post-independence states that communities
may regard as oppressive rather than representative.
The Kasane Statement on Illegal Wildlife Trade (March
2015) acknowledges the importance of community
engagement much more fully than the earlier London
Declaration, which may allow for space to debate more
nuanced approaches.
Taking a more expansive view of what illegal wildlife
hunting is helps one critically assess the ways that links
are being developed between poverty, hunting, and se-
curity. It is clear that claims that illegal wildlife hunting
is driven by poverty (defined as material deprivation)
which leads to radicalization, and helps fund conflicts and
terrorism are based on limited information, but they have
been taken up with remarkable speed by a wide range
of organizations (including the U.S. government); the ac-
ceptance of such arguments relies on the simplistic idea
that poverty leads to radicalism and that illegal wildlife
hunting offers a revenue stream. This assumption has the
potential to persuade conservationists to engage in
counter-productive and forceful responses to illegal
wildlife hunting (Duffy et al. 2015). A further risk is that
in some areas as enforcement intensifies, illegal wildlife
hunting will shift to hunting of less well-protected
wildlife populations (Roe et al. 2015). More sophisticated
and nuanced understanding of these dynamics needs to
be developed.
To do so, we suggest conservation researchers engage
more fully with the social sciences, especially regarding
the meanings of poverty and the relative importance of
structure and agency (Sandbrook et al. 2013). This will
help reveal the underlying assumptions in debates about
the links between poverty and illegal wildlife hunting and
set the stage for a fresh approach. Therefore, we suggest
2 next steps for researchers and conservationists alike.
First, conduct, with a variety of methods, more research
into the links between poverty and illegal wildlife hunting
and use novel methods to investigate sensitive topics
(Nuno & St. John 2014) and conduct qualitative and
ethnographic work with illegal hunters themselves to
gain a better understanding of motivations. This research
should be accompanied by greater self-reflection by
researchers on how the initial framing of the issue
of illegal wildlife hunting helps shape and determine
the kinds of information produced. Second, based on
an improved understanding of illegal wildlife hunting,
devise responses to illegal wildlife hunting that address
social inequalities and are sensitive to historical, social,
political, and economic contexts. Effective responses
will require viewing illegal wildlife hunting as a challenge
related to development rather than purely conservation.
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